DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 133 274 SO 009 691

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TITLE Values Education. Towards a Theory and Practice of Cultural Transformation.
PUB DATE [76]
NOTE 102p.

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.83 HC-$6.01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Beliefs; Case Studies (Education); *Developmental Psychology; Developmental Stages; Educational Objectives; Ethical Values; Higher Education; *Humanistic Education; Models; *Moral Development; Personal Values; Social Science Research; Social Values; State of the Art Reviews; *Theories; *Values

ABSTRACT

This document examines some of the major theoretical considerations and pedagogical applications of values education. In six chapters, the author reviews relevant developmental psychology literature and explores the major sociological dimensions of values education. "The Development of Values as an Educational Objective" summarizes various theories about the goals of values education. It is recognized that responsible individuals must act within a values framework, but there are problems in prescribing any one system of values in a pluralistic society. "Towards a Conceptual Framework for Values Education" reviews theoretical justifications from three viewpoints: the organismic-structural-developmental view (Stewart, Piaget, Kohlberg), the philosophical-social-psychological view (Lawson, Phenix), and the scientific view (Eckhardt, Rokeach, Maslow). "Four Models of Values Education" describes values clarification, Kohlberg's moral development theory, Allen's environmental-moral reasoning, and the Coombs-Meux moral reasoning model. Curriculum, teaching methods, and reexamination of society's values are discussed in "Institutional Contexts of Values Education" and "Values Education and the Emergence of New Paradigms." A case study of an interdisciplinary undergraduate humanities course is analyzed in "From Theory to Practice." (AV)

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VALUES – EDUCATION

Towards a Theory & Practice of Cultural Transformation

by

Harry Wagschal

SP009691

ABSTRACT

A critical examination of some of the major theoretical considerations and pedagogical applications of 'values education' in a North American context. In addition to describing a theoretical framework based largely on sources from the developmental psychology literature, the work attempts to explore some of the major sociological dimensions of this type of education.

Modern values-education is seen largely as a manifestation of deep anti-technocratic currents within the contemporary culture reflecting a pedagogical movement towards much greater concern with a student's 'perceptions' and 'internal states' and suggesting actual criticism of the scientific paradigm. A case study of an interdisciplinary Humanities course at the undergraduate level is described.

....."To a society which will value man and which consequently will institute a fully critical education as a dominant human value.

(Ernest Becker)
(Revolution in Psychiatry)

....."All meaningful knowledge is for the sake of action and all meaningful action for the sake of friendship.....

(John MacMurray)
(The Self as Agent)

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INTRODUCTION

At a meeting of the Association for Humanistic Psychology (November 1, 1975) called 'Beyond the Crisis - Creating the New Education', Howard Kirschenbaum pointed out that 'humanistic education' was a highly fragmented field where a variety of theoreticians and practitioners were functioning independently, largely unaware of each other's work. My own major objective in writing this work was to link a series of diverse sources from the social scientific, philosophical and humanistic education literature with a view to clarifying, criticizing, broadening and integrating a sub-field of humanistic education called 'values-education'.

More specifically my own reading on values-education has focused on two major concerns:

1) The relationship between social and psychological theories of values-education and actual 'practice' in an educational setting.

2) The potential influence of major normative changes in modern technological society on current practices in values-education.

I have been singularly fortunate that as a member of the founding faculty at Dawson College, the first English post-secondary institution in Quebec and a member of both its Humanities and Sociology departments since 1969, I was given every opportunity to test many of the theories and ideas advanced here in a public educational setting. In a real sense this work represents an attempt to integrate my actual teaching experiences in the course 'In Search of Values' with a body of knowledge in values education and contemporary social criticism.

I am indebted to Professor Reginald Edwards of the Department of Educational Psychology, McGill University, who has always been an inspiration to me, for his infinite patience and innumerable suggestions as well as Dean Hitschfeld of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for his personal concern at a significant time. I am also grateful to Mrs. Barbara Snyder of the secretarial staff of the McGill Graduate Faculty of Education for her invaluable assistance.

My wife Donna Weippert-Wagschal has been a major influence in creating and sustaining my interest in the area of values education and I deeply appreciate her assistance and support at all stages of this work.

CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES AS AN EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVE

A significant number of notable educational theorists, historians and social scientists have suggested that due to major cultural and institutional changes occuring in North America, a systematic approach to values-education is necessary for students at all levels of schooling. Brameld, Shimahara, and Benne have all commented on some of the major upheavals in what Bell (1973), has referred to as the 'post-industrial' society[1] and have called for a systematic 'rethinking' of educational priorities.[2] In the popular literature, Toffler (1970), has described how grave psychological problems and social 'anomie' arise in advanced societies as individuals are forced to live in a constant state of flux where traditional value symbols of religion, family, education and community are declining in status.[3]

Since societal changes in values and attitudes have serious implications for curriculum development, a considerable amount of discussion has taken place on the role of 'values' in the educational process.[4] One major concern has been on the actual feasibility of values development as a valid educational objective. Bloom had already pointed out that teachers taught material primarily to fulfill cognitive objectives where "standardized tests used by the schools compare student performance with that of some national norm and lay stress on intellectual tasks involving recognition or recall of previous knowledge and the reordering or application of this knowledge to solve problems posed by the examination."[5]

Some of the reasons for the traditional neglect of 'non-cognitive' objectives probably lies in certain attitudes which were formed in previous generations. These might include the belief that 'affective' objectives cannot be obtained in the relatively short period of a school year or semester but might require a much longer period of time once formal education is ended. Another view might reflect a certain traditional hesitancy to interfere in an individual's private concerns such as his political preferences or his feelings and attitudes towards his own family and social role. For teachers sharing these views, grading on any other educational objective but the purely cognitive would be "unthinkable."[6]

Yet, it is obvious that educational objectives are not 'absolute' but reflect certain cultural standards and economic goals within a given society. Thus if religious societies can attempt to inculcate educational objectives of a 'spiritual' dimension and technocratic societies are concerned with the development of technical and highly cognitive skills so an authentically humanistic society might conceivably encourage an education concerned with 'affective' and valuational objectives. Stratton has suggested that values should be regarded as being in the area of the 'abstract' and related to 'end states' of existence closely aligned to lifestyles and one's individual objectives and goals. In her definition;

> "Values are those qualities of life considered by the individual and society to be important as principles for conduct and as ultimate goals of existence."7

Though traditional social psychology has concerned itself more with beliefs and attitudes than with 'values'[8] Rokeach's recent work stresses the distinction between beliefs, attitudes and values which, in his view, form a functionally integrated cognitive system where

a change in any part will affect other parts of the system and will inevitably culminate in behavioural change. For Rokeach, a belief system represents the total universe of a person's beliefs about the physical world, the societal world and the self....."while an attitude is one type of subsystem of beliefs, organized around an object or situation which is, in turn embedded within a larger subsystem".[9] Values are distinguished from beliefs and attitudes i: that they are centrally located within one's belief system or how one 'ought' or 'ought not' to behave or about an 'end state' of existence which might or might not be valuable. Values are those abstract ideals concerned with ideal modes of conduct and goals such as 'truth,' 'beauty,' 'justice,' 'compassion'. Some examples of ideal goals are security, happiness, freedom, equality, fame or power. Though an adult might have tens of thousands of beliefs and attitudes he only has dozens of values in the form of a value-system representing a rank ordering of ideals or values in terms of importance.[10] (See Appendix I)

The significance of values as an educational objective had already been delineated in the modern classic Taxonomy of Educational Objectives Handbook Two - Affective Domain.[11] In this volume there is an attempt to distinguish between 'Acceptance of a Value' which might include educational objectives such as continuing to develop speaking and writing skills, desiring optimal health, or becoming responsible about developing participation in public debates from 'Preference for a Value' which signifies that an individual is sufficiently committed to a value to pursue it or seek it out.

Common examples might include interest in enabling other persons to obtain satisfaction of basic common needs or writing letters to the press about issues one feels strongly about. 'Committment' implies that belief at this level is of a high intensity. Here an individual acts to further his value which might include loyalty to the various groups in which he holds membership or acceptance of the role of religion in personal or family living. (See Appendix II)

Some writers have even pointed out that values involve both affective and cognitive components[12] while Scriven has suggested that rational evaluation involves bringing reason to bear upon value issues.[13] In this process one proceeds to identify skills involved in rational evaluation by imagining 'new' kinds of altermatives, bringing factual knowledge about various consequences and empathizing with those holding a different value position. He adds that it is important to provide cognitive and affective skills which might be necessary to challenge previous assumptions and create new value conclusions in the light of new situations.[14] The process of developing values involves moving from 'what is' to 'what ought to be' and implicates a continuous interaction of cognitive and affective components of the personality. Some humanistic psychologists have pointed out that a value system is highly necessary for the individual if he is to discover his real strengths and achieve responsibility for and awareness of his actions. Maslow's conception of the healthy person involves respect, acceptance, freedom of choice and a value framework which he can use to determine his own priorities and devote himself to, since the 'healthy' personality is an integrated system where cognitive, affective, and motor dimensions are working

together towards growth and 'self-actualization.'[15] These 'self-actualizers' will invariably try to achieve values of serenity, kindness, courage, love and unselfishness.[16]

Since man exists as a social being, students require a usable system of human values based upon valid knowledge of man and society. As modern technological society exists in such a state of flux and rapid social change, Raths emphasizes that the individual needs help to deal with the complications of modern life.[17] The values-clarification process involves stages of awareness, identifying value alternatives and their consequences, selecting personal values from the alternatives, internalizing the values selected and acting in accordance with these values. It would seem that the school can play an important role in assisting these processes by implementing various aspects of value-education within its curriculum.

Yet, there are some serious considerations which must be brought to bear on this role of 'values' in the curriculum. Beck has pointed out that value-education has been largely neglected in Western systems of schooling because of some serious philosophical objections.[18] One of these objections might be that values are 'relative' to an individual's beliefs and preferences and are strictly a matter of personal feeling, opinion or choice. In disagreement with this position, Beck suggests that a totally 'isolationist-subjective' approach to values must be replaced by a 'limited objectivism'.[19] He points out that the study of ultimate life goals can be an objective study since the changes within a person's life-goals can be studied scientifically. At the same time the study of various means necessary to achieve 'ultimate'

life goals can be studied to see if certain actions do lead to the achievement of various goals. Thus, those who suggest that value questions are purely relative are denying the possibility of the kind of objective study which Rokeach has been carrying out at Washington State University. Though there might be some variations in emphasis, human beings pursue an interconnected group of ultimate life goals such as survival, health, happiness, meaning, fullfilment which provide a solid basis for the detailed study of values which might be carried out in schools. Another objection to the teaching of values in the school is that it is dangerous for most people (particularly children) to reflect upon them. This position states that even though value principles may safely be inculcated immature minds must not be encouraged to question their meaning or probe purposes behind them. Any discussion on value alternatives will undermine students unquestioning acceptance of a value position of significant status. Unfortunately, this kind of 'reluctance' to question values might lie in the conscious or unconscious fear that the traditional values have an inadequate basis. In a changing society established values must be modified or even revamped over certain periods of time while a reluctance to discuss values assures a static view of social change.[20] If values are valid social reflections of important societal concepts then assessing and reflecting on them might even strengthen them. Certainly 'verbalizing' values without any regard for their real 'appropriateness' is hardly a critical approach to important issues. Without serious reflection and analysis values become a mere 'parroting' of cultural traditions.[21]

Another argument which is advanced against values-education in the schools is the so-called problem of 'indoctrination'. Values are considered to be 'controversial' and those teachers involved in values-education will appear to be indoctrinating students. However, many subjects which are by nature highly controversial such as 'history' 'physics' 'mathematics' have been made to appear 'non-controversial' by teaching them dogmatically and by excluding controversial issues from their substance. Surely progress can be made in discussing value issues without indoctrinating students. For example, though a value issue might be discussed and different conclusions reached by half a dozen students this should not mean that each student must agree with the other.[22]

Beck suggests that to avoid the problem of indoctrination by teachers there must be a continuously flowing body of imformation brought to bear on value issues and a genuinely free situation in the classroom where students can disagree. At the same time values must be conducted at the level of fundamental goals and general principles rather than specific 'prescriptions' for thought and action. "Instead of avoiding values-education for fear that students will be indoctrinated, one notes that students are being indoctrinated anyway, ensures that an enormous amount of relevant information and ideas are made available to the students and creates a genuinely free situation so that students are not indoctrinated by this material but rather use it to fight indoctrination."[23]

Another criticism of values-education is the argument that there

is so much cultural and ethnic diversity that the school cannot take a position on values since it might affect a particular group. However, as Illich has pointed out, the school already inculcates a whole series of values through its 'hidden curriculum' which suggests that certain things are more important than others.[24] Even though some individuals might maintain that values should not be taught in the schools but only in the home, schools can play one part in contributing to a student's future value development. Since it is quite true that the home has an enormous impact on the child's early development and these early influences have great significance for his or her future development, the school can only modify what has already been done at an earlier age. A school, therefore, concerned with value-development would not take over the value training of the child completely but would only concern itself with disseminating 'educational' values (as Rokeach has suggested).[25] Since Dreeben has shown how the process of schooling invariably inculcates values of 'independence' 'specificity' and 'industry',[26] by neglecting to 'focus' on values it gives a student the impression that the 'evaluative' aspect of thinking is unimportant. On the contrary, schools can play an important part in values-education through a variety of techniques which will be mentioned in this paper.

Both Rokeach and Beck stress that the very importance of values in the kind of society we inhabit has made it necessary that the school play a role in identifying 'ultimate' 'life' goals of people in general and students in particular, through the identification of general principles and strategies for achieving these life goals. In addition, there are various 'value awareness' skills, knowledge, and

habits which are necessary to gain insight into one's own behaviour. If education is to deal with more than the purely vocational and professional it must seriously consider the quality and depth of actual daily existence where a serious concern for values is important. Rokeach's research has suggested that the major determinants of human values are culture, society, and institutions. While all societies can be conceptualized as possessing a 'more or less' common set of social institutions in religious, educational and economic aspects, each institution can be seen as specializing in the transmission of certain kinds of values from generation to generation. In Rokeach's conceptualization on educational institutions, schools specialize in the transmission of 'educational' values, while a religious institution specializes in 'religious' values and so on.

Rokeach's research on educational values indicates that the educational terminal values assigned by professors of education and school administrators are 'a sense of accomplishment, self-respect, wisdom and freedom' and the top four instrumental values are responsible, capable, broadminded and intellectual'.[27] In addition, Rokeach points out that terminal values such as equality, inner-harmony, and family security and honest, courageous, imaginative, independent, logical are also 'educational' values though some might be shared by other institutions.

> "Thus even though we cannot as yet be altogether sure that we have succeeded in identifying all the values that each of the social institutions specialize in, it is nonetheless, clear that some subset of the total spectrum of human values can reasonably be called educational values." 28

Rokeach believes that the school can deal with values in various ways. One way is through a substantively oriented

values-education which would attempt to increase self-awareness and awareness of others. In this type of substantively-based values-education students would be made aware of their own values, of the extent of value similarities and differences among various cultural, ethnic, socio-economic, sexual, occupational groups and the extent to which students' own values are similar to or different from those of various positive and negative reference groups. Rokeach stresses that the schools must try to abandon their position of value neutrality 'because such a position can neither be defended theoretically or philosophically nor substantiated empirically.[29]

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13. Michael Scriven, "Values and the Valuing Process," quoted in Dorothy Stratton, "The Development of Values: An Educational Objective?", Educational Resources Information Center, Washington, 1971, p. 13.

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15. Abraham Maslow, (ed.) New Knowledge in Human Values, Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959.

16. Ibid,

17. Louis Raths, Harmin Merrill, and Sidney B., Simon, Values and Teaching, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1966.

18. Clive Beck, The Case for Value Education in the School, unpublished manuscript, 1975, p. 1.

19. Ibid, p. 2

20. Ibid, p. 2

21. Ibid, p. 3

22. Ibid, p. 4

23. Ibid, p. 10

24. Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society, New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

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26. R. Dreeben, On What is Learnt in School, Mass: Addison Wesley Co. 1968.

27. Rokeach, p. 120.

28. Ibid, p. 121

29. Ibid, p. 125.

CHAPTER TWO

TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR VALUES-EDUCATION

Though values-education is still in its infancy as a major educational movement, a substantial body of theoretical work exists from many of the major disciplines such as social psychology, religion, philosophy, and sociology which might provide the conceptualbasis for the development of this kind of education. Some major theoretical justifications for a potential values-education include:

1) The Organismic-Structural-Developmental View (Stewart, Piaget, Kohlberg)

2) The Philosophical-Social Psychological View (Lawson, Phenix)

3) Scientific View of Values (Eckhardt, Rokeach, Maslow)

One of the most highly developed views on values-education is reflected in Stewart's writings on the subject.[1] Stewart points out that is morally necessary to create a framework for a topic as controversial as values-education since any other view of such a complex topic represents only a set of highly subjective biases and prejudices.[2] Certainly, a conceptual framework does allow for a more integrated scientifically-based view than a set of 'opinions' about the subject. At the same time, a conceptual model will lead to some basis for future evaluation, a greater number of 'researchable hypotheses' and the possibility of "greater effectiveness, heightened efficiency and more enduring impact."[3]

Stewart distinguishes between four varied approaches to the problem of values-education,

1) The Traditional-Authoritarian Approach
2) The Cultural-Relativistic Approach
3) The Absolute-Relativist Approach
4) The Organismic-Structural-Developmental Approach

The first approach, 'The Traditional-Authoritarian Approach' is based on the belief in absolute values which have meaning apart from and extensive to man. Man exists to learn values which he must apply to his own life. These values become part of the traditional and symbolic structure of the society and individuals are required to respect them and fulfill them in their own lives. Man is a 'tabula rasa' through which society imprints values through indoctrination, sanctions, rewards or socialization figures such as parents, teachers, political leaders and the like. A neat division exists between what is 'good' and what is 'bad' and most socializing exists to propagate those tendencies on the 'good' side of the ledger. Stewart points out that greater or lesser versions of it may be observed in practice or in history by analyzing the socialization process of the Catholic Church, and some forms of Communism, the Boy Scouts, institutional and fundamental sects in the U.S., the Klu Klux Klan and many schools throughout the world.[4] This approach to values is very similar philosophically to Butler's analysis of idealism where values are seen as permanent, transcendent and impermeable and truth is seen as absolute and fixed.[5]

The Cultural Relativist-Adjustment Approach has some similarities with the previous one, but with some major differences.

One important detail is that values are seen as 'culturally relative' where members of a social system must learn to adapt to the normative standards of their own society. Thus, though values might be culturally relative they are 'absolute' for members of a particular society. Here, members of a society are socialized with traits such as conformity, acceptance and adjustment. This approach has been greatly influenced by psychoanalytic traditions and cultural anthropology where man is seen as a creature in continuous conflict with himself to control his passions and repress his deepest needs in favour of conformity with society's standards. In contrast to the traditional-authoritarian approach which is concerned with the unusual consequences of various acts for a body of metaphysical beliefs this view of man emphasizes interest and motivation, self-control, and guilt-inducing anxiety.[6]

This approach was implemented in the late 1940's, 1950's and early 1960's and deeply influenced the Human Relations Movement of administration and management. Values-education of this type pays a great deal of attention to the submission of the individual to the group and the social necessity to conform within a society. Many business and industrial organizations have used these techniques to create a climate for 'morale building' and leadership skills.

The third view, the 'Absolute-Relatavistic Approach' is the distinct outgrowth of certain tendencies in the 'existential' school which declared that all values are relative and that there are no absolute ethical principles or moral rules, "it is absolutely true that all values are relative."[7] Undoubtedly,

the effects on many individuals of the horrors of two World Wars and the rise of humanism and existentialism led to this almost nihilistic denial of all 'values.' Novak, the social philosopher, has analyzed the historical origins and contemporary manifestations of this nihilistic philosophy and calls it 'the experience of nothingness.'[8] Some of the techniques used to socialize individuals into this form of relativistic 'ethos' include sensitivity training, Gestalt therapy, the 'do your own thing' spirit and many liberal and radical 'anti-authoritarian' programs and movements. Both the value-free curricula and the value-clarification approach are examples of this form of education. Students are encouraged to think through topics for themselves where the solutions are of equal value and no one can legitimately pass judgement on them. Emphasis here lies on individual freedom, healthy spontaneous growth and tolerance of other individuals and cultures.

> "The absolute relativistic approach makes the person either supreme or at least central, de-emphasizing the structure and organization of the environment and the external world and asserts that it is right and necessary that the individual assert himself, find his own way, construct reality on his or her own terms and recognize that there are no absolute values." 9

In a partial confirmation of this view, Rogers has pointed out that in his psychotherapeutic work with patients, he observed certain kinds of tendencies of valuing in the mature person which includes an 'organismic' basis for an intrinsic valuing process within the individual. Rogers has observed, " that both personal and social values emerge as natural, and experienced, when the individual is close to his own organismic valuing process," and suggests that "an organismic valuing base might exist within the person which will prove to be an organized, adaptive, and social

approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of us."[10]

The 4th approach the 'Organismic-Structural-Developmental' approach to values-education is based on a 'different' view of man, the environment and the relationship between them, than the other views discussed so far. Relatively new as an approach to values its historical roots can be traced back to the mind-body dichotomy in the history of philosophy. Stewart defines 'organismic' as the study of man as a functional whole rather than the Cartesian view which splits man into two parts, body and mind, or the 'Wundtian' view which sees man as a series of sense perceptions and various forms of sensations or even the Skinnerian perspective which sees man as dependent on certain 'environments' to develop certain kinds of behaviour. In this organismic view man is studied in a 'healthy' state rather than in a pathological state. Organismic theorists perceive man as intrinsically activist and motivated and reject the idea that explanation of man's activity and motivation must be drawn from external sources. It is the very nature of life to be active, to seek self-realization or self-actualization, to be dynamic. In this view, man plays an active energetic and constructive role in forming his own values and in his active relationship with the environment. Stewart uses the term 'trans-actional' to distinguish it from 'inter-actional' which is based on an overly simplistic model of human relationships.

> 'The individual is structured by and structures the environment in his own terms in the complex relationship that exists between them. The organismic relationship with the environment is a selective-reflective one in which certain feelings, activities, and elements are evaluated as being useful and valuable and others as not."[11]

Thus, regardless of the kind of environment available the human organism operates within the environment in terms of its own structures, processes and input. The idea of an 'objective' 'expert' position can not logically exist since each individual transform his own experiences of reality into the structure which he possesses. In the same way, the possibility that a group or an individual can apprehend reality so well that they can define it ar establish it as 'the reality' for others is impossible since no such situation can ever exist in an organismic view of mankind. The organismic view stresses that individuals are always translating 'objective reality' into their own terms.

At the very heart of the organismic views of values-education is the term 'structure.' This term, which has been used extensively by the cultural anthropologist, Levi-Strauss, refers to the intrinsic properties which certain organisms seem to posses which permit them to be distinguished from other types of organisms. Though structure as used in anthropology refers to linguistic and societal patterns, for the purpose of describing the 'organismic' form of values-education 'structure' refers to the kind of thinking which precludes giving an answer to a difficult ethical issue i.e. some form of 'though-organization' behind cognitively oriented statements. Piaget had defined structure as one aspect of intelligence, the other two elements being content and practice. While 'content is the free manifestion of language such as 'yes' or 'oui' function can be seen as the self-determining invariant part of intelligence which

allows the organism to be consistent. One of the processes involved can be described as organization (referring to an underlying systematic pattern of relationships within the mind). 'Adaptation'is the process observed in the external world where the organism assimilates and accomodates itself to the external world. The conflicting forms of assimilation and accomodation form a duality which represents a model of equilibration followed by disequilibration and equilibrium. Stewart points out that the equilibration process is at the very being of the organismic-structural development approach and represents intelligence at its most unchanged and biological aspects.[12]

Between the external 'content' and this unchanged function Piaget assumes the existence of structure. Flavell points out that for Piaget, structures are 'the organizational properties of intelligence, organization, created through functioning and inferable from the behavioural contents whose nature they determine."[13] These structures result from the interactional changing environment which an individual is part of and the physiological apparatus which he brings to the given situations. Thus, psychological structures change from one level to another as the organism matures, progressing through a series of stages. Stewart suggests that:

> .....a structure is an organizational thought-pattern that undergoes transformation in its relationship with the environment, but operates in a self-regulating

> way in order to maintain continuity , stability and equilibrium both in itself and the organism. The transformation that structures undergo are equilibrated or dynamically balanced and self-regulated in increasingly more complex integrated and effective ways with maturation, experience and transaction with the environment. 14

The implications of this kind of conceptualization for a new kind of values-education lies in the fact that a values-education curriculum must be totally cognizant and sensitive to the level of structural complexity of the child before an attempt is made to 'teach' values or consider ethical and moral issues. As structural properties in the brain increase and as the organism matures so can the curricula include concepts which can only be understood at a proceeding stage. It becomes imperative for the teacher to be aware of the level of structural development of the student and his ability to assimilate material and accomodate himself to changing environmental conditions.

Another key word in this new conception of the human being for values-education is the term 'developmental'. According to Gesell (1954) development refers to an unfolding of behaviour patterns according to some sort of genetic timetable In this theory genetic factors dominate over environmental changes. In contrast to this theory is the 'associationistic' or 'heuristic' approach which suggests that development is a function primarily of the environment. Though organic growth is necessary, development is maintained through various forms of association, particularly instrumental or operant conditioning. Development occurs through an accumulation of appropriate conditioning factors. Stewart's view of development is quite unlike these other two

since it stresses that development occurs due to actual cognitive growth and the child's awareness that other individuals have various perceptions, attitudes and knowledge which are quite unlike his own. "Thus, the alternative of moral-ethical ability is wholly dependent on this progressive development of self."[15] Values-education would have to carefully consider the cognitive tendencies of the child and his ability to emphathize and sympathize. Since, in this view, development is neither genetic as Gesell and his associates have hypothesized or conditioned by the environment (as Skinner has suggested) the transaction between the organism and his environment plays a major role. Growth results from the interaction of the organism and the quality of the surrounding environment.

An important concept in the developmental view of man is the concept of 'stage.' Human development from primitive modes of though to highly developed scientific reasoning is seen as the progressive development of human cognition through various stages. The stages are not automatically age-related or absolute since they are the result of 'transaction' of the individual with his cultural milieu and the kinds of experience he has assimilated. However, each stage is necessarily dependent on the proceeding stage. Piaget postualtes four major periods of cognitive development and Kohlberg suggests six 'stages' of moral development. (See Appendix III)

The Organismic-Structural Developmental view in its analysis of human cognitive and moral development has demonstrated that there is some underlying universality in the manner which man

structures his social experience and assumes social perspective. 'Looking at acts' can lead only to a narrow view of values. Looking at the theory behind these acts (structures) can lead only to an understanding of the basic universality of structures, process and development.[16] According to Stewart, Kohlberg's research justifies the claim that there is an approach to values which is both philosophically and psychologically sound.

Other approaches which are experimentally or scientifically based as Stewart's approach exist in the social psychological or philosophical literature. Lawson has tried to create a framework for the teaching of values based upon an analysis of four writers; Adler, Dewey, Sullivan and Fromm. After an examination of each of these writers he tried to show that in this historical development from idealism to social psychology "a general shift or sweep has been described from a focus upon the ideal to one upon the actual, from sources of moral insight independent of experiences to sources which are sought within concrete social situations."[17] In Lawson's view psychological data concerned with the nature of human nature and human interest can act as a critical agent of existing principles thus allowing philosophers and teachers of values to discover whether such principles are congruent with the nature of man. As well, psychological data about motivation and 'learning theory' can produce a critique of educational programs which attempt to teach moral principles. Certainly, criticizing moral principles from the standpoint of empirical knowledge of man is warranted. In Lawson's view moral educators should strive to develop awareness which urges man to examine his motives as well as the consequences of behaviour, and to examine alternative views of life while developing an appreciation of various life styles. According to Lawson, social

psychology has permitted us to grasp certain educational objectives from their empirical studies on human nature. These five aspects of 'moral ideals' include awareness, dignity, responsibility, and a capacity for reason and love.

Closely related to Lawson's analysis, the philosopher Phenix has attempted to sketch a theory of values-education which is relevant to a society in a state of social and cultural turmoil. Phenix's conception of the 'anomic' position is similar to Stewart's relativist position which states that in a time of widespread cultural change, where persons become anxious and discontent a real prevalance of apathy appears. An 'anomic' theory of values can never have any educational significance since it denies the meaning of the universe and is destructive of human action. A more constructive position lies in the 'autonomic' outlook which suggests that there are norms and values which are dependent on those individuals who make them. This kind of relativistic position is quite similar in some respects to Stewart's position and Phenix states that scientific studies of culture have given great credence to this theory. If the autonomic theory is followed, however, it is pointless to teach people how to act since all moral decision is thus defined by political strategy. In stark contrast to this theory, Phenix suggests another view called the 'teleonomic' which suggests that there are objective standards of values "that promote clear and concise norms of judgement for human conduct."[18] In this theory people do not create values but rather discover them where "moral demand is grounded in a comprehensive purpose or 'telos' that is objective and normative but that forever transcends concrete

institutional embodiment or ideological formulation."[19]

Phenix suggests that this search for values be based on a tentative, open-minded approach to social and philosophical problems. Individuals must truly become 'learners' and begin to participate in a 'dialogue' where differing perspectives are shared on many complex issues. The role of the school in this form of 'moral instruction' is "to develop skills in moral deliberation through bringing to bear on concrete personal and social problems, the relevant perspectives drawn from a variety of specialized disciplines."[20] The most important criterion for this kind of values-education is that it provide a whole range of perspectives, social, aesthetic, economic, religious to bear on significant issues from the specialized disciplines. Education must be organized to include both multi-disciplinary programs on social and personal issues and specialized disciplinary exploration.

One of the significant manifestations which points in the direction of a value-based pedagogy in the future is the upheaval which is presently taking place in our modern conceptions of 'scientific thinking' concerning 'value-free' versus 'value-laden', 'subjectivity' versus 'objectivity'. This major controversy in the philosophy of science which has had implications for most of the social sciences has created a whole series of issues which might totally radicalize the teaching of the humanities and social sciences. The seminal work on this conflict between those who see science as being based on an 'objective' model of society and those who see scientific work to be invariably based upon personal

and societal variants including values, feelings, needs was Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In this volume, Kuhn tried to show how what is considered to be scientific thinking proceeded from paradigms, which were accepted by a majority of scientists working in a field. As the paradigm shifted and changed almost inperceptibly new pieces of information, speculation and historical events almost invariably affected the model so that eventually a 'new' model arose which then again became the institutional order of things until a 'new' challenge arose. Kuhn's theory showed quite clearly how significant human passions and societal events were in the development of scientific thinking and pointed the way for a greater involvement of observer's values in the scientific process.[21]

Since the time of the sociologist Weber this debate between 'value-free' and 'value-laden' sociology has been carried out between noted sociologists and philosophers of science. According to Gouldner, when a social scientists thinks that he has made a choice he has merely come to it through the basis of some moral value. According to him "one cannot be objective about the world outside, without, to some extent being knowledgeable about (and in control of) ourselves. In normative objectification of one of the central problems is to know our values and to see that such knowledge is problematic."[22] Sociological educational must become much more a form of values-education where potential social scientists learn how to articulate, classify and understand the limitations and problems created by their own value perceptions. Unless sociologists can perceive that their studies of industrial

society invariably force them into the position of assuming that the 'status quo' of bureaucracy, institutional goods and services are only one form of social reality, sociology will be largely a form of 'liberal market research.' Gouldner strongly suggests that "it is to values, not to functions that sociologists must give their most basic commitments."[23]

Some theoretical work has already begun on the premise that 'scientific' work requires a value position at its very inception and Eckhardt has suggested that all scientific inquiry be conducted with a view to making the value of 'compassion' its major focus. According to him "the general value of compassion can and should become a norm in relation to which all other values theories and facts in the social sciences can and should be evaluated as to their adequacy, their authenticity and their contribution toward human development."[24] At the compassionate level, truth is whatever serves the purpose of changing minds and societies in the direction of compassion within an equitable distribution of values among all human beings as far as this is humanly possible.[25] In like view to Gouldner, Eckhardt reaffirms Hartman's view that all facts are "frozen values" when "all scientific truth is a matter of correspondence with certain values, some of which have been transformed into facts by social convention".[26] In his analysis of different types of personalities, Eckhardt has noted that authoritarian political and educational structures both play a major role in developing highly compulsive attitudes and behaviour, while a 'liberal' or 'value-free' and 'objective' educational system facilitates conformist attitudes and behaviour. Eckhardt

hypothesizes that a 'radical' form and content should probably produce more compassionate attitudes and behaviours and suggests that educational activities such as discussions, where the individual can participate more fully, or critical reading and analysis do lead to important changes in attitudes and behaviour."[27] Confirming this view, Rokeach's research on values does suggest that informing students about their values does lead to actual value change over a long period of time. In his research, Rokeach describes how value change leads to cognitive reorganization of remaining values in the system culminating in behavioural change.[28] Though his sampling procedures are at present too small to make predictive judgements there is some basis for closely examing the relationship between value-change and future personal and political behaviour.

In addition to this specific social psychological and sociological work on 'values' some significant theoretical work is presently being done at the Stanford University Educational Policy Research Center on the societal and educational consequences of a 'moral science' based upon values. "The chief implication of a moral science is that, by its over-riding concern with what is good for man, it is forcing changes in the dominant paradigm of contemporary science."[29] Though many social scientists have tried to formulate the theoretical structure of a value-laden science (Gouldner, Barber, Kuhn) physical scientists themselves have played a large role in these debates and discussions. Kantor points out that Polanyi, Bridgeman, Oppenheimer, Thompson, Bronowski, Eisely and many others have tried to completely re-examine the premises which underlie the 'scientific method'. Even modern neuro-science has shown that 'subjective experience' plays a significant role in the process of intellectual judgement and threatens the behaviourist

position of an organism subject only to various forms of conditioning patterns.

> "As a dynamic emergent property of cerebral excitation, subjective experience acquires causal potency and becomes a causal determinant in brain function. Although inseparably tied to the material brain process, it is something distinct and special in its own right "different from and more than" its component physiochemical elements." 30

Sperry suggests that this 'revised' interpretation of the brain will lead to a swing "in psychology and neuro-science away from hardcore materialism and reductionism toward a new, more acceptable brand of mentalism.....to restore to the scientific image of human nature some of the dignity, freedom and other humanistic attributes of which it had been deprived by the behaviouristic approach."[31]

Maslow's work represents a major attempt to create a "humanistic" science based on the instrinsic'goodness' of man. In this view, human growth and'self-actualization' can be scientifically measured. Maslow's research suggests that the Freudian vision of the conflict of society's demands against the evil and anarchistic impulses of the individual 'id' is a faulty model since the 'self-actualizing' individual will invariably choose what is good for society. Thus, the major concern of those involved in educational management or political enterprises is to create the environmental conditions whereby the individual can develop in a way which is self-actualizing. To Maslow and the school of humanistic psychology, knowledge of self through value-awareness, 'clarification' and 'confrontation' must become a major educational objective within a humanistic educational process.[32]

FOOTNOTES

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19.Philip Phenix, "The Moral Imperative in American Education," in H. Kirshenbaum, Sidney Simon, (ed) Readings in Value Clarififcation, 1973, p. 43.

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21. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revoultions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.

22. Alvin Gouldner, "Objectivity - The Realm of Sacred In Social Science," quoted in Values Objectivity and the Social Sciences, Mass: Addison Wesley, 1974, p. 54.

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24. William Eckhardt, Compassion - Towards a Science of Value, Canadian Peace Research Institute, Oakville, Ontario, 1973

25. Ibid, p. 25

26. Ibid, p. 207

27. Ibid, p. 221

28. Rokeach, p. 216-219

29. R. Kantor, Implications of Moral Science, Stanford University Educational Research Centre, 1971, p. 1

30. Roger W. Sperry, "Left Brain - Right Brain," Saturday Review, August 9, 1975, p. 33.

31. Sperry, p. 33.

32. Maslow, p. 127 His conception of the'self-actualizing'

person includes these qualities:

1) Clearer, more efficient perception of reality
2) More openness to experience
3) Increased integration, wholeness and unity of purpose
4) Increased spontanaiety, expressiveness, full-functioning aliveness
5) A real self, a firm identity
6) Increased objectivity, detachment
7) Recovery of creativeness
8) Ability to fuse concreteness and abstractions
9) Democratic character structure
10) Ability to love

CHAPTER THREE

FOUR MODELS OF VALUES EDUCATION

Though the kind of theoretical work on values-development mentioned in the previous chapter is still at a relatively 'primitive' level, actual teaching strategies for values-education already exist.[1] This state of affairs exists because the need for 'effective' and 'modern' pedagogical techniques by teachers is so great that 'approaches' have been created without necessarily waiting for 'scientific' evidence to substantiate a given practice. Thus, the field of values-education is not a neatly developed systematic model where one theoretical discovery leads to an actual implementation or where implementation leads to new discovery, which in turn enhances the previous model. Rather, values-education at this stage is a field where a variety of approaches seem to exist quite independently of each other. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to examine some significant values-education strategies with a view to determining some of their major characteristics, strengths and weaknesses.

On the international scene, a variety of approaches exist. These range from the projects in British Schools of such individuals as Wilson and McPhail, to those in Canadian high schools in Ontario following the work of Beck. However, in the present context examination will be made of the most significant approaches within a North American context. (See Appendix III for summary of Canadian Values-Education Projects)

1) The Values-Clarification Approach

2) The Kohlberg Moral Development Approach

3) The Allen Environmental-Moral Reasoning Model

4) The Coombs-Meux Moral Reasoning Model

The Values-Clarification Approach is probably the best known and most utilized values-education technique in existence. Most of the underlying theory of this approach is based on the principle that students are living in a world which is highly confusing where traditional values are being constantly questioned. The Values Clarification approach is therefore an attempt to 'personalize' education[2], so that students' actual feelings, needs and life-goals play a role in their educational development. Much of it is based on Rath's book Values and Teaching which in turn was heavily influenced by John Dewey's theories on 'valuation and actions.' Specifically, this approach is based on a psychological model of human development where 'self-actualization' and 'personal growth' are treated as important variables. The actual process of values-clarification is based upon the personal life experiences of students, utilized by the teacher to help him discover each student's incipient values. Various clarifying responses are used to help the student develop these 'incipient' values into 'true' values. According to Raths a fully-formed value must fulfill the test of seven criteria. A fully formed value must be:-

1) freely chosen,

2) from among many alternatives,

3) the consequences of which must be fully explained,

4) must be prized and cherished,

5) publicly approved,

6) acted upon in daily life,

7) repeatedly.[3]

Many kinds of teaching strategies exist to assist the teacher in helping students to clarify and develop their own values into 'true' values which will meet the seven criteria. These range from utilizing values-clarification approaches within school subjects such as English, Mathematics, History, Science, Home Economics, Health and Sex Education to actual value-development within the family unit using various 'dinner-table' learning approaches and other devices. Values-clarification can also be used as a technique in various forms of organizational-development and group dynamics.[4]

The teacher's role in the values-clarification process is that of creating an atmosphere of trust and security where he acts as a facilitator or discussant rather than as an authority or leader; he must always consider and present alternative ways of thinking where contradictions between beliefs and action are becoming apparent. The expected result of this approach where students are treated as individuals, is that the students will all move towards embracing similar moral principles such as kindness, compassion, self-knowledge, sensitivity to others etc.[5]

Though values-education hasgained a large number of adherents and is practiced in thousands of schools in North America some serious objections have been levied against it. Rokeach has

suggested that there are some significant flaws in the basic premises behind value-clarification, Most significantly, Rokeach observes that values-clarification's insistence on 'values-neutrality' is mythical, since its high regard for the seven criteria previously mentioned are real value objectives in themselves. "Is it not value-obfuscating rather than value-clarifying to teach such values through the back door and at the same time give the impression of value-neutrality through the front door?"[6] Rokeach further suggests that actual substantive values-education and making students aware of their own values should be practiced in the schools, in addition to the simpler values-clarification practices. (See Chapter Six for examples)

Stewart's criticisms of values-clarification are somewhat more extensive than Rokeach's. Stewart points out that while value-clarification deals with the 'content' of values within the process of valuing it ignores the most significant aspect of the issue, the structure of values and valuing, particularly structural development (See above, Chapter Two). Stewart suggests that many of the so-called benefits of values-clarification occurs from 'peer pressures' where only the strongest personalities among a group of teenages would be courageous enough to affirm their opinions.[7] At the same time Stewart critizes values-clarification for its stand on moral issues since if all values are considered to be similar and relative to each other, (as in values-clarification,) there can be no hierarchy of moral values. Stewart is also highly critical of any research findings in this area and points out that many of the studies on this subject are based on highly subjective and biased research designs.[8] Moreover, at this time, research

in this area presents so many problems that most conclusions cannot be taken seriously.

The second major framework for the teaching of values arises from Kohlberg's work at the Harvard University Moral Education Project. Much of Kohlberg's theoretical work is also based on the thinking of John Dewey but with the added knowledge of moral development of Jean Piaget. According to Kohlberg there are certain universal moral stages which all people in all cultures go through. From Dewey's postulations of these levels of moral development, the pre-moral or pre-conventional levels, the conventional and the autonomous level, and Piaget's experimental work with children involving the pre-moral, the heteronomous and autonomous stages, Kohlberg evolved certain principles which lie at the basis for his own thinking about values and moral development. These principles are:-

1) Stages are structural wholes or organized systems of thought which permit an individual to make consistent judgments about moral issues.

2) Stages are points in a sequence, an invariant sequence where movement is always forward, never backward, to the next higher stage in the sequence. Stages are defined as responses on a verbal moral dilemma scale, moral dilemmas presented to students, mainly in personal interviews. In these dilemmas which the individuals are asked to consider, Kohlberg postulates ten universal moral values. These are:-

1) Punishment
2) Property
3) Roles and concern of affection
4) Roles and concern of authority
5) Law
6) Life
7) Liberty
8) Distributive Justice
9) Truth
10) Sex

For Kohlberg a moral choice involves choosing between two (or more) of these values as they conflict in concrete situations of choice.[9] Depending on the stage or structure of an individual's moral judgment we can surmise what he finds valuable and why he finds it valuable. Six stages are postulated. for example, in Stage 1 life has a value for its possessions and the person involved; Stage 2 for its usefulness in satisfying needs of the individuals in question; Stage 3 in terms of individual's relations with others; Stage 4 in terms of social and religious law. In Stages 5 and 6 each life is considered to be intrinsically worthwhile.

The key objective of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental theory is to stimulate movement from one level to the next without actual indoctrination. In contrast to a values-clarification approach, Kohlberg restricts his educational effort on values to the concept of 'justice'. According to him, the public school should only attempt values education in regard to an awareness of justice or of the rights of others in the Constitutional system. Thus much of Kohlberg's work is concerned with the development of this sense of justice through actual pedagogical techniques and educational structures. Moral discussion usually involves:

1) Exposure to the next higher stage of reasoning

2) Exposure to situations suggesting problems and contradictions for the child's moral structure. The outcome leads from dissatisfaction with the state presented in the problem to a higher level of value formation.

3) Creating an atmosphere of trust and dialogue[10]

Even though Blatt has demonstrated that where the level of discussion conforms to Kohlberg's prescription, experimental measures of level of value formation shows an increase in the stage or level of values achieved,[11] Kohlberg himself seems as much concerned about the 'moral atmosphere' of a given environment as he is about actual discussions and moral problems. Recently, he has spent a great deal of time in setting up a 'Just School' which is based on the principles of real democratic participation and involvement with significant moral issues.

Though Kohlberg has been a major influence on contemporary values-education he has his share of critics. Peters points out that Kohlberg's 'biased' view of universal moral stages is uni-dimentional and neglects to consider different ways of achieving the principle of justice. There is a failure to grasp that a utilitarianism (in which the principle of justice is problematic) is an 'alternative' type of morality and that other people, such as Winch, have found a moral of 'integrity' in which the principle of universalization is problematic.[12] For Peters, Kohlberg's idea of morality is just <u>one</u> view of the moral development process and other substantial positions exist. Peters is also

most concerned that for the masses of citizens a solid exposure to Stage 3 and 4 (a conventional morality) might be necessary if society is to function smoothly, since everyone cannot be expected to incorporate the highly complex higher stages into the developed personality.

One of the serious objections to Kohlberg's Moral Development approach however, must be that it is unrealistic to hope that teachers are able to be continuously just 'one level' higher than each student in classroom discussions since, for a given number of students, too many separate stages are found to be present. At the same time is it realistic to assume that teachers themselves have reached this final level of moral development? In addition Kohlberg's serious neglect of affective education variables (guilt, personal feeling, anxiety) has also created a rather 'lopsided' view of the nature of moral judgment. Moral development is seen more as an actual 'intellectual' enterprise rather than a real personal conflict within an individual to come to terms with important values conflicts.

Another major criticism of Kohlberg's theory of moral development has come from the University of Minnesota psychologist Rest. In a recent paper given at the Values-Education Conference in Oakville, February 1975, Rest argues that even though cognitive development theory has been 'a substantial research base,"[13], Kohlberg has 'overrepresented' his findings concerning shifts in moral stages from one level to the next. Rest points out that 'longtitudinal' change by itself is not sufficient evidence to establish the validity of a test of moral judgment.[14] Conceivably,

people are changing their 'level' of cognitive sophistication not because (as the cognitive developmentalists would like to claim) new cognitive capacities are allowing them to achieve 'higher' forms of reasoning, but rather because changes in the child's social environment reflect new modeling and reinforcement contingencies. Hence, since parents talk differently to a four year old than to an adolescent cognitive changes must inevitably occur.[15] Rest suggests that many 'alternate' evaluative mechanisms are required to fully explore the implications of Kohlberg's moral development stages.

One of the most highly developed models of actual values-education is Allen's work at the University of Florida. As one of the few value educators to actually state value objectives rather than just deal with 'moral stages' and 'clarification' his work answers some of Rokeach's objectives that schools deal with conflicting educational objectives.[16] In his work on environmental education Allen suggests that the following values should be the probable outcome of a values programme.

1) Reciprocity, Equality and Universality. This means that students will identify with others' interests and feelings akin to the Spinozian moral imperative. The moral person wants nothing for himself that he does not want for all others.

2) Empathy. This suggests that one develops insights into one's feelings, motives, intentions as well as having a great deal of knowledge about one's own self.

3) Factual Knowledge. Here the student masters factual knowledge and 'scientifically' sound knowledge of human behaviour involving facts, concepts, generalizations biases.

4) Social Ethical Principles. This means being able to use the 3 components above to formulate values and value principles which are related to the way societies function. Here the individual lives according to some consistent guiding principles which he believes in.

5) Personal Ethical Principles. This refers to the ability to use the 3 components for a rational assessment of a set of rules and value principles related to one's own life and interest. Those rules must be linked by the person's interaction with others.

6) Moral Judgments and Resolutions. This means that the student has the ability to translate moral principles into moral judgments and evaluations in specific interests.

7) Actions. This means being able to integrate all rules in nos. 4, 5, and 6 into actual concrete situations. Here the person translates his values constantly into actions and lifestyle.[17]

Allen's conception of values-education is a much broader and more pedagogically useful one than Kohlberg's since it suggests that 'moral reasoning' is but one aspect of value-development. At the same time Allen has linked much of these value-skills to the actual curriculum(specifically environmental issues)and has developed a model which students can apply to value issues.

Some very intense work on moral reasoning is presently being carried out at various universities in the U.S. and Canada. In the National Council of Social Studies Yearbook (1971) Donald Coombs and Milton Meux argue for specific strategies for teaching skills of 'value-analysis' which will assist students in making

their most critical decisions as well as helping them to develop skills which will allow them to resolve value conflict between themselves and other members. According to these authors students must carry out six tests before their objectives can be met. These are:-

1) Identifying and clarifying the value question
2) Assembling purported facts
3) Assessing the truth of purported facts
4) Clarifying the relevance of facts
5) Arriving at a tentative value decision
6) Testing the value principle implied in the decision

Coombs and Meux suggest a series of ways whereby students can learn to identify or clarify value questions. Teachers must play an active role in these deliberations by asking leading questions which clarify the question further. In the next stage students must learn some of the academic skills necessary to assemble the necessary 'facts' on a given value issue. Teachers should be particularly concerned with helping students distinguish 'factual' from 'evaluative' assertions and not mistake value assertions for factual ones. An interesting technique which could be used here is a 'fact-assembly' chart where students can list positive and negative facts about a 'fact' as well as their own personal concerns.[18] As well students can learn techniques of 'fact criticism' by using asked questions such as:-

1) How do you know this is true?

2) What evidence is there to conclude that this is true?

3) Do other authorities agree with what he says?

They must also learn to utilize facts which are 'relevant' to the case. Here students can use an 'evidence card' which allows them to distinguish between what the relationship is between

a value judgment and a fact. Coombs and Meux also suggest some very interesting techniques which could make students aware of some of the value implications of their choices. Some of the techniques suggested include the subsumption test, the role exchange test, and the Universal Consequence Test.[19] In this procedure students are challenged to consider the implications of their value decisions for individuals who might be affected, by them or by the student himself in a context where this value was being applied, and even in a given 'Kantian' 'moral imperative' where a value decision is seen as linked to consequences for all individuals universally.

One of the important theoretical components in Coombs and Meux's work is the whole area of ego development theory which suggests that the ability to perform value analysis is quite similar to certain levels of 'ego functions' which have been researched by the psychologist Jane Loevinger. According to this theory 'capability for formulating a fully rational value judgment is according to ego development theory achieved only at the highest stage of ego development.' Loevinger herself believes that the very process of moral conflict is 'education' and has suggested that "it is not the answer but the questions asked that both show and stimulate moral development."[20] Loevinger and her associates are presently attempting to create an evaluative mechanism which will actually measure ego and moral development among individuals.

Though Meyer mentions a proliferation of values-education, centres and exponents throughout North America and Western Europe (Appendix IV) p. 90-111 Values Education) little consideration

has been given to a classifying system which might begin to distinguish between all the different types of values education presently being offered. However, it seems that at present certain basic approaches in the field exist which set them apart.

1) The Moral Development Approach is the most widely used approach which actually strives to raise the level of moral development of a student by using various 'hypothetical' dilemmas (See Chapter Two). This model is psychologically oriented and is based on creating some movement towards a higher level of stage development.

2) The Affective-Personal Growth Approach is closely tied to a whole body of 'affective' or 'humanistic' education which also deals with student values but as a by-product of an intrinsic educational concern with personal growth, inner-personal development, self-assertion and self-knowledge. The Values-Clarification Approach and various forms of Humanistic Education play a significant theoretical and practical role in the major bulk of techniques used.

3) The Moral Reasoning-Social Studies Approach closely resembles a traditional 'intellectual' type of education where students learn certain types of skills in value-analysis and apply these skills in various forms of critical thinking.

4) The Programmatic-Problem Centered Approach allows students to actively focus their attention on certain key issues which might affect their lives such as ecological issues and the 'emerging future.'

Though significant, many of these views of values-education are fragments of an evolving body of larger educational theory which is presently being created by thinkers and practioners throughout the world. Since most of these attempts at values-education are based on a 'psychological' framework and involve models from this discipline the author is attempting to create a model of value teaching which is based upon a 'wider' educational view involving the 'reconceptualization' of curriculum and the role of ideas in affecting human actions. Hopefully this attempt will lead to a 'reformulation' of the meaning of educational experience to deal with a rapidly changing world.[21]

FOOTNOTES

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4. Kirshenbaum, p. 327-335

5. Meyer, p. 73

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13. J. Rest, "The Validity of Tests on Moral Judgment," in John Meyer Values Education, p. 103-114.

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17. D. Coombs, M. Meux,"Strategies for Value Analysis," in L. Metcalf, Values Education, Rationale, Strategies & Procedures, National Council for the Social Studies, 1971, p. 37-47.

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21. William Pinar, p. 1-12.

CHAPTER FOUR

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXTS OF VALUES-EDUCATION

It is insufficient for an authentic values-education to concern itself only with changesin course content and process since a number of notable educational theorists such as Illich (1971), Apple (1974) and Stewart (1974), have pointed out that a great deal of actual student learning is affected by the 'hidden curriculum'. This 'invisible' sociological force which refers to the size and structure of the school buildings, the status relationship within the school and the manner with which the teacher plays her role, all significantly affect a student's perceptions of major educational factors. Thus, for serious consideration of changes in value orientation to take place, students must experience an 'environment' which emphasizes those values under consideration.

Jacob systematically reviewed the impact of higher education on students' values and came to the following conclusions:

1) The impetus to change does not come from the formal educational process.

2) Students are "unabashedly self-centered" and greatly value the 'material' aspects of life.

3) College advances no great change in values but increases conformity, "more homogeneity and greater consistency of values among students at the end of their four years than when they began."[1]

Jacob's study was seriously criticized by social scientists and administrators[2] since other studies found that 'in general students changed in the direction of greater liberalism and

sophistication in their political, social and religious outlooks.[3] Eddy, Brown and Bystrymer showed that the best way to transmit values is to create an 'atmosphere' on the campus. Eddy further discovered that experiences outside of the classroom were of particular significance in determining character while certain aspects of the environment and surroundings, extra-curricular activities and moral standards can seriously affect what a college offers its students.[4]

Dresell and his associates conclude that "results of both longitidunal and cross-sectional studies of college students demonstrate that significant changes in the attitudes, values, interests and beliefs of college students do occur between the freshman and senior years. However, there is no one factor which explains changes in attitudes and values since the subject is highly complex and involves a whole series of inter-related variables involving:-

1) The nature of the modifying experience
2) The type of contact
3) Personality make-up of the individual
4) Group's approval of new alternatives
5) Subject's perception of the outcome

According to Dresell there are certain contradictions which might occur between the purpose of 'critical thinking' of the university itself and some of its academic policies and regulations. "A college which presumes to have a desirable impact on the critical thinking, abilities, attitudes and values of its students, may find that its grading practices, regulations and policy-making procedures may have a undesirable impact concerning the changes sought in students."[5]

Thus, if institutions are to promote new values they must concern themselves with 'larger issues' then specific courses and teaching techniques. A major body of educational theory loosely called "reconstruction" has attempted to create the framework for future educators, administrators and teachers to promote educational values which they might consider significant. Shimahara has tried to bring together a notable body of theorists and practitioners in educational theory to consider the whole area of major cultural, philosophical, political and social values affecting the educational process. Shimahara conceptualizes a 'transformative' psycho-cultural orientation' which differs considerably from the traditional Parsonian model of 'sociological functionalism' and the 'New School' Movement. According to this theory the most significant element lies in 'the transactional interplay between the individual and culture.'[6] In this view culture is seen as something modifiable "because individuals can alter cultural forces to make them congenial."[7] Heavily influenced by John Dewey this view of education stressed the actual perception of the individual in determining change.

> "Trouble with traditional education was that it emphasized the external conditions that enter into control of experiences but that it paid so little attention to the internal factors which also decide what kind of experience is had."[8]

This attempt to create a 'transformative orientation' stems largely from critical awareness of major human crises. On the other hand, many of the problems of survival have become exacerbated on this planet in the last 20 years including

ecological crises, over-production, irrational over-consumption, the destruction of nature, the over-exploitation of natural resources and overpopulation. Shimahara points out that our education has failed miserably in that individuals are unable to identify with some of these major issues but only with their own personal affairs and surroundings. Commenting on the future of society he points out "In general pessimissim tends to overshadow optimisim, for schools have failed to become a frontier for social change, and education in general, has long been regarded as an agent playing passive cultural roles within the framework of sociological functionalism."[9]

Why is this 'transformative psychocultural orientation' (which attempts to shape 'new values' in the educational process) necessary? For Brameld our planet does not have the luxury of choice about its education since serious technological and humanistic problems make it imperative that a 'reconstructed' educational deal with a 'new' way of sustaining educational activities. Brameld sees non-educators such as Saul Alinsky and Ralph Nader as prime examples of this new kind of educational force which will attempt to 'build for' something such as the 'city of man' and primary humanistic values. The school must become the agency which recognizes the grave problems facing mankind and organize itself to deal with the issues.[10]

Yet, obviously, it is not possible for an educational structure to change itself without recognizing its sociological context and its restraining elements. Nash, in his attempt to provide a cultural perspective on the problem of a 'reconstructed

school' points out that schooling is an integral part of a technocratic ethos which strives to dehumanize and systematize all facets of human actions.

> "The technocractic ethos is identifiable by the following principles: it stresses relentlessly the viability of efficiency and productivity; it strives for an extensive, rational control over every endeavour; it features an organizational log which accentuates integrational, functionality, modernization and extreme systematization; it emphasizes techniques, performance, competency and expertise; it fixates compulsively on objective data such as predictability, calculability and measurement and it makes a conscious deliberate effort to transmute the beliefs and procedures of all fields to the scientific world views."11

According to Nash, even though technocracy has created many advantages and comforts for mankind,it has also achieved "a reductive power over man" which reduces all things to a "calculable functional quality so that everything can be ultimately controlled. Echoing Jules Henry's earlier social and educational criticism in Culture Against Man, Nash suggests that most of the 'systems analysis' and functional rationality of the centralizing modern nation is a manifestation of drive to conquer and predict which have no boundaries. For Nash, we are living in an age which practices values associated with crypto-conservatism which institutionalizes objectivity as some sort of cultural myth.

> "The myth of objectivity has become an essential prop for the technocratic 'Weltanschaung'. Technocratic man regards objectivity as the essence of reliability and truthfulness. He associates the objective with the functional, the evidential and the concrete. He believes that clean-cut abstractable data, especially the quantified rigoursly specified kind are superior to all other types which he regards as ephemeral and fuzzyminded." 12

Yet this 'irreconcilable dichotomy' between thinking and feeling is totally contradicted by the work of existential psychologists who have demonstrated that the creative investment and confirmation of external meaning is a total process originating from the individual."[13] Nash suggests that

> "in the end the pursuit of objectivity becomes the conforming spirit of cryptoconservative technocracy. In spite of its tendency to bury normative premises behind the rubble of data, objectives, facts, evidence, statistics, and neutrality cruptoconservative education exists as a powerful-manipulative bias. For, whatever thier conscious 'value-free' intentions, cryptoconservative technocrats maintain their established interests. They celebrate technological innovation but maintain a relatively stable technocratic order. And the schools become the political mainstay of the whole system fueling the status quo providing the insuperable experts, technocrats, managers and teachers needed to run the machine."14

Yet, Nash attempts to delineate three responses to this form of all encompassing technocracy which are slowly making their way into the consciousness of various groups and individuals within the society. First he describes the 'gnostic' response which attempts to seek for answers within his own 'subjective awareness' through group encounters, emotional release, non-intellectual sense awareness exercises and fantasy experiences. Much of this kind of philosophy in education can be seen in the educational process which stresses inner direction, group process and 'facilitation' of self based n to some degree on the writings of George Brown and other 'Consciousness III'educators such as Richard Jones and other affective educators.[15]

The Anarchistic Response is another response to technocratic society which attempts to reject all cultural forms of authority which are "arbitrary, coercive and dehumanizing".[16] Unlike the gnostics who are concerned with the meaning of self, the anarchists "protest specifically against these institutional norms and values which prevent persons from seeking alternative cultural arrangements and block persons from making contact with each other in genuine communitarian relationships."[17] This outlook has already had significant effects on educational arrangements in various 'new conditions' which provide much greater 'freedom' to students such as various forms of 'open education' where students are perceived as capable and intelligent and teachers are 'open' facilitative and warm. Finally, the activistic response is motivated by an ideological desire to 'transform' the socio-political and economic structures of the technoculture which is involved in a true revolutionary political consciousness against oppresive power in the form of dehumanizing and corporate forms of genocide as expressed through war."[18] Some activists have perceived that academics have become politically impotent by the nomenclature of 'professional' and have urged a total reconstruction of the modern university which would eliminate all forms of administrative control and bureaucratic machinery which have been imposed upon the community of scholars. They also recommend a college curriculum which is more involved in actual world conditions and express contempt for the traditional academic preoccupation with abstract knowledge and for the 'value-free' objectivity which the social scientist utilizes in his trade. Scholars must not continue to make artificial disjunctions

between feeling and acting but should make as their primary objective the achievement of specific 'politically relevant' acts.

Nash emphasizes his belief that the enculturation process is regenerative only when it prepares its members to understand and value themselves as persons (the gnostic contribution) when it enables members to experiment with alternative cultural forms and more communitarian living arrangements(the anarchistic contribution) and when it lays the possible ground work for radical educational and socio-political transformation (the activistic contribution)[19]. He suggests that we follow Slater's advice to draw up a 'human-value' index to appraise technocratic systems in terms of criteria which are genuinely human ones. This 'human criteria' should include values such as physical, psychological, spiritual or personal joy,where 'satisfaction 'or 'freedom 'could be used to determine how effectively the technocratic system in functioning.

In defense of this argument against the technocratic ethos, the anthropologist Lifton has pointed out that philosophers such as Cassirer and Langer view man as possessing a deep need to create inner meanings which have some fit with the outside "as he perceives it."[20] Lifton believes that the large bureaucratic organizations hardly satisfy man's deepest needs since they threaten his autonomy and his personal identity[21]. All human strivings must be seen in the context of the 1962 Port Huron Statement of the SDS which stated "Our work is guided by the sense that we may be the last generation in the experiment with living."[22] All attempts to deal with values must consider Lifton's analysis of modern life very carefully.

> "In a very real sense, the world becomes a total environment, a kind of closed psychotic chamber with continuous reverberations. The symbolic death perceived is a combination of formlessness and toality or lack of inner form but a sense of near total external control." 23

The behaviour of young people in the late sixties was indicative of a new kind of revolutionary form which did not see revolution in the total fixed ideological terms of other revolutionary predecessors. Revolution was based on spontanaiety or 'new' view of historical possibilities, and an attempt to mobilize individuals against various forms of unresponsive institutions (universities, governments and families) and a technocratic society which programs its computers and workers.

Any search for values by people must consider the fact that one of the 'controlling images' which exists in direct opposition to post Cartesian absolutism is that of replacing history with experience.

> "Today's young have available for their formulations of self and world the great twentieth century insights which liberate men from the senseless of the experiential versus rational bind,.. particularly to the principle of symbolic thought expressed in the work of such innovators as Cassirer and Langer, Freud and Erickson and also to principles of fluidity of though and image taught us by George Braque, Pablo Picasso, Jackson Pollock, James Joyce, T.S. Eliot and Gunther Grass. Lifton sees young people engaged in a search for new forms, new ways of thought, new values where "everything is threatened. Nothing is certain. Everything is before us."24

According to the political scientist Hunt, one of the significant features of a modern values-education is to offer students a view of the 'dialectic' between democratic ideals and social realities which would challenge them to create new ways of bridging this gap between ideal and reality. For Hunt, the school has been a relatively reactionary institution which has made almost no attempt to provide children with the knowledge, skills or theory to play an activist role in society. Hunt sees a 'new education' through forms of direct democracy, town meetings, cooperatives, poor peoples cooperatives,as possible ways individuals can begin to understand how significant their own views and values are in influencing the direction of their own history.[25]

Yet, Hunt does not see the 'new education' as a form of politicization or indoctrination into a specific type of ideology. Reconstructionalists advocate that schools become centers where political goals are made available to individuals in a spirit of free inquiry where the basic issue lies in its educational significance rather than 'political' strategies. Thus, the test of truth is not be be found in any specific political ideology but in the appeal to evidence and reason since one great problem of politicization is that indoctrination might replace 'free open inquiry.' Students must be given'opportunities'to see how their own society and their own lives contradict the important values of truth and democracy which they appear to hold, yet students cannot be <u>forced</u> to do anything about these contradictions and cannot be coerced into action.

Yet, one of the important mainstays of a 'new' view of

education is its emphasis on this view of knowledge as something which should lead to action. A majorcritique of academics, teachers and other educational professionals is the view that knowledge exists for its own sake while ".....educators, because of their non-intervention in the course of human affairs have to that extent contributed to the problems that presently face us on an institutional basis."[26] A new values-education would link knowledge with forms of actions which would be critically examined and once again be integrated into new forms of knowledge.

In addition to a political and cultural analysis on examination of 'curriculum' is highly important for any type of new values-education. Apple is one of the leading exponents of what Pinar called the'reconceptualist' school in curricular theory. For Apple, 'new' values within the educational process can only accrue from a radical 'rethinking' of the function of curriculum in modern society. Unfortunately, most educators possess a 'limited' and 'naive' view of what constitutes curriculum since the traditional curricula and "schooling have little potency for raising questions about existing institutions and the assumptions which underlie them. That is, curricula assists in the process by which an accepted and often questioned pattern of institutions and culture is internalized by the young."[27] Apple sees institutions as being reified since they are studied outside of their historical context and become 'crystallized' and thus a 'seemingly necessary' part of man's consciousness. Unless schooling can do more than certify or socialize by allowing students to reflect critically and culturally, examine innovative trends, alternative structures and their own language of thought it can have very little transforming or value-

giving significance. Greene had already pointed out that some drastic shifts in 'consciousness' had taken place in many individuals within the last decade so they became aware of the arbitrary nature of many of the "social arrangements" external to them.[28] Rapid change, new symbols and a need among many individuals to reconstruct 'personal meaning' drastically threaten the traditional curriculum.

Apple sees a 'new curricula' as being much more complex than previous authorities in the field had noted and suggests that a curriculum must satisfy a number of multiple dimensions if it is to be 'successful.' These dimensions must include a systems knowledge of how variables such as symbol and informative systems, physical environment of building and furniture and technological 'aids' such as books, laboratory equipment and audio-visual equipment, and 'personal' qualities such as technical skills, theoretical and metatheoretical knowledge interact with each other. Other educational philosophers such as Friere had pointed out how teaching is a moral act which influences other aspects of a social system and must be seen outside of a purely pedagogical context.[29] In most cases pedagogical processes are but the material representation of conscious and unconscious symbolic structures and rarely represent a 'rational' attempt to assist the learning process. Huebner had already suggested that curricularists could begin to envision alternatives to institutionalized modes of educational interaction .[30]

Unless those involved in the educational process will re-examine their own basic assumptions, views and biases about the nature of reality they cannot even begin to proceed to create 'new curricula'

or allow students to seek 'new values'. Illich had suggested that 'the hidden curriculum' affects the student's perception of reality as much, if not more, than courses and programs. Certainly, effective values-education implies that a great deal of consideration must be given to actual value-examination of a teacher's own religious and ideological assumptions. "Unless we question the economic and political structures outside and how they have affected education we cannot deal with values with any integrity."[31]

FOOTNOTES

1. Philip Jacob, Changing Values in Colleges, New York: Harper and Row, 1957.

2. Nevi tt Sanford, The American College, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962.

3. E.D. Eddy Jr., The College Influence on Student Character, Washington: American Council on Education, 1959. p. 99. quoted in Ohmer Milton.

4. R.C. Dressel, "The Impact of Higher Education," quoted in Ohmer Milton, Learning and the Professors, Ohio University Press, 1968, p. 111-1

5. Ibid, p. 121

6. N. Shimahara, p. 9

7. Shimahara, p. 10.

8. John Dewey, Experience and Education. New York: Collier, 1969. p. 42

9. Shimahara, p. 14

10. Theodore Brameld, "Self Fulfilling Prophecy as an Educational Objective," in N. Shimahara, Educational Reconstruction, p. 30-38.

11. Robert Nash, "A Cultural Prospective" in N.Shimahara, Educational Reconstruction, p. 39.

12. Ibid, p. 45

13. Ibid, p. 46

14. Ibid, p. 46

15. Ibid, p. 54

16. Ibid, p. 54

17. Ibid, p. 57

18. Ibid, p. 59

19. Ibid, p. 59

20. Robert J. Lifton, "A Psychocultural Prospective," in N. Shimahara, Educational Reconstruction, p. 77.

21. Ibid, p. 77

22. Ibid, p. 82

23. Ibid, p. 85

24. Ibid, p. 85

25. Thomas C. Hunt, "A Political Perspective," in N. Shimahara, Educational Reconstruction, p. 87

26. Howard Ozman, "A Philosophical Perspective," in N. Shimahara, Educational Reconstruction, p. 144.

27. Michael Apple, "Curriculum Deisgn and Cultural Order," in N. Shimahara, Educational Reconstruction, p. 157.

28. Maxine Greene, "Curriculum and Consciousness", in William Pinar, Curriculum Theorizing - the Reconceptualists, Berkley: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1974, p. 299-314.

29. Paulo Friere, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New York: Herder & Herder, 1970

30. W. Huebner, "The Task of a Curricular Theorist," in W. Pinar, Curriculum Theorizing the Reconceptualists, p. 250-269.

31. Ozman, p. 179.

CHAPTER FIVE

VALUES EDUCATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF 'NEW PARADIGMS'

Some writers have suggested that the development of both theoretical knowledge and practical application concerning values education has become a major necessity for the actual survival of modern technological society. In the last decade a body of social criticism has been produced which suggests that only a total re-examination of values can lead to a society which approaches some form of humanistic-democracy.[1]

The most ambitious and far-reaching of these 'new consciousness' critiques is Ferkiss' attempt to demonstrate that traditional political and social theory such as 'liberalism', 'conservatism', 'socialism', are anachronistic in terms of the kinds of 'realities' which contemporary modern man must endure. Ferkiss has gone further than all of his predecessors by engaging in a social analysis of technological society which leads him to actually create the kind of new 'value models' which are necessary if technological society is to survive. For Ferkiss,

> "The modern age has been distinguished by two essential characteristics. In the intellectual sphere modernity has involved the growth of rationalism and the attempt to understand and conquer nature through mathematical reason: this rationalism has been accompanied by an emphasis on the dualism between mind and body and between humanity and nature and by downgrading of feeling and affect at the individual level and of tradition and community at the social level. In the physical realm, modernization has been characterized by the unlimited growth of human population and the unlimited impact of human artifice - of techonology - upon the earth and by the creation of a worldwide technological society." 2

He sees the 'modern era' as almost drawing to a close where the combined pressures of population growth and of the technologically conditioned use of the earth's resources approaching the point where further expansion will be impossible. This natural conclusion to the growth tendencies in modern society will lead to the 'healing of the rupture between mind and body, individual and society and in man and nature and the first stirrings of the post-modern era will occur in the most technologically advanced societies, particularly in the United States.[3] Ferkiss sees 'liberalism' as a totally outmoded form of social philosophy where the emphasis on the 'growth' and 'freedom' of the individual is a useless idea in terms of the interdependence between nations created by various technologies. As well, liberalism has contributed to 'an unrelenting and remorseless assault on nature.'[4] Echoing some of the earlier criticisms and proposals of futuristically oriented writers such as Erhlich, (1974) Meadows and the Club of Rome, Ferkiss suggests that we must rethink our basic values concerning our birthrate and our standard of living or else we must all perish.

Two of Ferkiss' major criticisms of traditional 'liberalism' concern its undue emphasis on process and compromise and its insensitivity to the holistic-nature of man's existence as created by the ecological systems of which he is a part. By not making decisions to protect the status quo,liberal philosophy is inadvertedly making certain kinds of decisions which will have major long range impacts. Thus, to Ferkiss, 'compromise', the principle position of liberalism is simply a complex form of deadlock, whereby future events are shaped but not enough to make any crucial difference.[5]

In his analysis of the emerging 'planetary society' and the ideological bankruptcy of our 'outmoded' value models, Ferkiss has constructed a new political and social paradigm which might have serious implications for the future development of our corporate and educational structures. Ferkiss suggests that the 'new technological man' in opposition to the 'bourgeoise man' of liberal society has to carefully consider three synthesizing principles in his view of technological society - naturalism, holism, and immanentism. 'Naturalism'refers to the assumption that man is part of nature and must invariably make decisions in accordance with this fact, 'holism' emphasizes that everything in the universe is interconnenected and integrated into a single system and 'immanentism' suggests that any grand restructuring or reordering can never come from external sources alone but must come out of what already exists. 'Ecological humanism' is the term that Ferkiss applies to this new philosophy which is necessary for man's survival on this planet and which stresses at all times man is part of nature and not opposed to it. Only a redefinition of man's relation to the universe, man's relationship to himself and an articulation of the political and social ideologies behind these assumptions can lead us toward the kinds of 'new values' which must be fostered in a future society.[6]

Kuhn had attempted to explain how scientific truth changes from one generation to the next by suggesting that as contemporary events fluctuate so do the kinds of questions scientists ask change so that eventually a whole new 'model' of questionning emerges. Ferkiss' analysis of technological society is radically different

from previous attempts at political and social analysis since it has to consider and discern a considerable number of variables which did not exist at any other time in history. In similar fashion, a thorough consideration of the field of values education in contemporary society would have to ask a whole series of questions which might not have been relevant at any other time in history. Most significantly, some educational theorists such as Stewart have shown how superficial any attempts at value relativism are and have asked for a 'reconstruction' of the school to actually propagate certain kinds of values which are socially and culturally necessary for the development of a humanistic technology[7] while Rokeach has begun to demonstrate in his work on human values that value systems can be actually affected by certain kinds of techniques and practices. Maslow has created a psychological portrait of 'emerging man' who can transcend himself by virtue of his own consciousness but who requires basic attention to his elemental needs before he can proceed to seek 'self-actualization'. These thinkers in conjunction with other formost exponents of a 'radical education criticism have begun to create the kind of'new paradigmatic' structure which could lead to the kind of research and effort which might bear fruit for a future values-education.[9]

Stewart's major criticism of the school in values-education is that the 'hidden curriculum' of assumptions and attitudes behind the process of education actually reinforces all kinds of 'values' which are hardly worthwhile for a democratic society, values such as compliance, obedience and conformity Stewart points out ... it is clear why I believe that the hidden curriculum has been an effective

values/rules agent. It has succeeded, in my opinion, in matching the goals and objectives of the educational establishment with the needs and demands of the business-industrial-military complex that dominates[10]..... Certainly, if Stewart's assumptions are correct, then the school itself actually performs more of a value-conditioning function than a value-educating one!

Unfortunately, in many of the writings of those involved in the 'educational' aspects of values, a certain kind of naive, unrestrained romanticism replaces a critical examination of certain socio-cultural realities. Thus, even though movements towards 'reconstructing or'recreating' the school as a moral/values agent might be exactly what technological society needs, there is a substantial amount of Utopian and even simplistic thinking involved in these assertions. First of all, any movement towards 'reconstruction' would have to commence at a political or at least community based level if it is to affect educational structures (and if this is not to be the case,)it is hardly likely that the school will fail to reflect it more than the pluralistic values it presently upholds. Values-education will seemingly come from (as Brameld has pointed out) sources which are quite removed from any educational context (consumers movements, radical factions of the clergy, reform parties). Certainly, the nature of what constitutes 'vested interests' within educational bureaucracies and the whole area of 'resistances to education innovation' must be carefully examined before any hypothesizing can be made for the school as a reconstructing and moral force in contemporary society. Undoubtedly, movements towards specific training in humanistic theory and values-

education skills among teachers could be a major way whereby educational structures attempt to carry out objectives of serious values-education."[11] Specific research projects on the effects of 'alternative' and 'free-school' environments on students' perceptions and careful philosophical and linguistic analysis of the processes involved in analyzing value issues might also contribute to the development of a wider view of values-education than presently exists. However, deinstitutionalization of educational services (as Illich has suggested) will probably be a much more significant movement towards a 'new value system' for the educational process than specific courses in 'moral' education. In the author's opinion, values-education which only strives to deal with a student's level on a Kohlberg scale is hardly more than a form of tokenism to placate those who are critical of the school's value neutrality and hardly can serve as a substitute for an actual reorganization of educational services. Other serious issues which arise from a critical analysis of 'values-education' lies in the actual attempt on the part of educators to 'raise' the level of moral awareness. Should educators really strive to achieve this type of goal or should they be content to disseminate information of a 'value-laden' nature or just provide 'opportunities' for value debate and controversy? Some social commentators might conceivably view attempts by educators to raise 'moral' levels as only another attempt to socialize students into the dominant mode of thinking through less obvious methods than by threat and punishment. Longitidunal studies on the implication of value-shifts for

political action or personal decision-making might be carried out to demonstrate the social significance of values-education in contemporary society.

Another function of values-education lies in the possibility that many other agencies besides the school will serve to make citizens aware of the implications of their own values in a changing society. The school can act as one agency of values-education concerned with things of an 'intellectual' or 'aesthetic' significance while the family and mass communications media must also strive to learn techniques for viable values clarification and confrontation of individual citizens.

Yet, the real significance of this renewed interest in values-education stems from major epistemological changes in modern perceptions of scientific method and philosophical thinking. In his 1953 Gifford lectures, MacMurray had tried to come forth with a vision of man where the self would not just reflect on the world but would 'act' on it.

...."We can no longer conceive the Self as the subject in experience, and so the knower. The Self must be conceived, not theoreticaly as subject, but practically, as agent."[12] Kantor had actually proclaimed the birth of a 'moral science' in the 20th century which would replace the mechanistic value-free scientific objectivism of the nineteenth century. In this form of scientific endeavour all forms of human or technological action would be directly related to how it affected the course of human development and evolution.[13] Pinar and many of his associates had intensely explored this phenomenological field of the 'Self' and the implications of 'heightened consciousness' for the development of curriculum theory

and educational processes.[14] Above all, Pinar suggested that curriculum theorists study the 'inner self' through logs,biographies, dreams and analysis of subconscious states where 'subjectivity' itself would not be important but the relationship of 'subjective perception' to the outside world would be paramount.

Becker's vision of'post-scientistic'man pointed to a cultural rebirth where "the twentieth century will go down in history as the age when man first consciously saw the desirability of throwing off the automatic bond in which he holds himself via culture."[15] where "human authenticity' lies precisely in rejecting the excessive constraint of early environment in liberating oneself from its fetters."[16] For Becker modern man must learn to reject those cultural traditions which stand in the way of his development and ultimately his actual survival on this planet. Values-education might be one process which can play an important role in contributing to the transcendence of man over those cultural traditions which threaten his existence.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a more detailed discussion of this position see the authors Education and the New Consciousness Literature; Comparative Education Review, Vol. 18, 1, 1974.

2. Victor Ferkiss, The Future of Technological Civilization, New York: George Braziller, 1974, p. 8

3. Ibid, p. 9

4. Ibid, p. 59

5. Ibid, p. 59

6. Ibid, p. 89

7. John Stewart, The School as a Moral Values Agent, unpublished manuscript, 1974.

8. Questionning of the paradigmic structure of one of the social foundations areas, Comparative Education has already taken place. See Benjamin Barber ,"Social Science, Salience and Comparative Education,C/E,Oct 1972 and Harry Wagschal, " Radical Criticism and Its Implications for Comparative Education," Comparative Education Review, Vol. 18, 3, 1974.

9.Stewart, p. 7

10. Ibid, p. 10

11. For further discussion in this area see Paul Nash, "Humanistic Education for Teachers, unpublished manuscript, 1973.

12. John MacMurray, The Self as Agent,

13. N. Kantor, p.

14. W. Pinar, Heightened Consciousness - Cultural Revolution and Curriculum, Berkley: McCutchan Publishing Co., 1974, p. 1-15

15. Ernest Becker, Revolution in Psychiatry, New York: The Free Press, 1964

16. Ibid, p. 200

CHAPTER SIX

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE - A CASE STUDY OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY HUMANITIES COURSE IN SUBSTANTIVE VALUES-EDUCATION

With the passage of the General and Vocational College Act of 1967, the Quebec Ministry of Education created a network of junior colleges (College Enseignment Generale et Professionale) which today number 42. These CEGEPs were set up by the government of M. Daniel Johnson subsequent to a Royal Commision led by Monsignour Alphonse Parent which suggested major changes in the educational structures of the Province. One of the recommendations of this Parent Commission Report was that students completing their secondary education be given an opportunity of obtaining post-secondary education free of charge. Two major options would be offered, of which one would be to train students for specific careers in the technologies and the other would be to complete at least the equivalent of one year of a university program.

One of the specific curriculum recommendations of the Commissionwas that all students (regardless of their CEGEP status, technological-stream or pre-university) would be required to take various 'core' courses in Philosophy and in their mother tongue, French or English. This Philosophy requirement was interpreted by the English CEGEPs as a form of 'humanities education' where students would be given an opportunity to engage in various forms of intellectual, experiential and culturally enriching experiences in a largely non-threatening academic environment.[1]

In 1969, the first English language CEGEP was established

at Dawson College and here the author first developed a course in the category 'Man and his World Views' which was an attempt to create a form of substantive values-education based on some of writings of Stewart, Rokeach and Beck as discussed in the previous chapters. Much of the actual theory behind the course came from a reading of the 'humanistic psychologists' and philosophers (particularly Fromm and Maslow) who had pointed out in many of their writings how a 'breakdown' in values was taking place in contemporary Western society while most aware individuals were searching for new symbols, new forms of identification and new values. Thus, (in 1971-72) a course structure emerged which permitted students to think about the nature of human values in a changing society by reflecting on and discussing the ideas of important philosophers, psychologists, theologians and artists such as Martin Buber, Bertrand Russell, A.N. Whitehead, Jean-Paul Satre and Paul Tillich. The basic teaching methodology consisted of allowing students to choose 'key' ideas from short writings by these authors and by discussing (in seminar style fashion) the significance of these ideas for their own lives. In addition, most students kept a journal which consisted of daily entries and which sought to link their own feelings and perceptions with the ideas of the course, as well as their own reactions to various discussions and readings. The theme of the course and the potential significance for decision-making in their own lives was carefully analyzed.

Course evaluations were carried out at the end of each three month semester between 1971-73. It became quite evident that:

1) Even though students represented a wide range of intellectual abilities and reading skills they expressed a deep and consistent interest in the course content and format.

2) Most students were enthusiastic about the idea of the journal, which many believed helped them to integrate their experiences in the course. It would be safe to assume that students wrote at least twice as much during the term as they would have don in a 'traditional type' humanities course.

3) Many students were motivated to continue reading in certain areas and requested that the course be extended into a following term. (See Appendix V)

Based on these very encouraging conclusions. the author then engaged in a systematic attempt to read on all aspects of 'values' from philosophical, sociological, psychiatric and religious perspectives with a view to developing an integrated multi-credit program in the area of values-education. In line with the author's reading and arising from interaction with students the course went through various structual and pedagogical changes (where some of the ideas of the 'affective educators such as Weinstein and Brown began to play a prominent role) and serious consideration was given to the possibility that this type of course structure might have some significant 'mental-health' implications on students' self-perception and personal awarenese and growth. Some of the psychologically oriented ideas were incorporated in an article published at this time (1972)[2]. Requests for further information has led to discussions with members of a variety of university departments of humanities, psychology and social work as well as psychiatric hospitals and mental health centres, which in turn has had an effect upon subsequent course preparation. Specifically,

the author began to give serious consideration to the actual psychological implications of 'substantive' values-education for a student's personal and intellectual development. Rokeach's intensive studies assisted the author considerably in coming to grips with the socio-psychological implications of values-education as well as helping him to frame numerous ideas for new techniques which involved 'confronting' students with contradictions in their own value-systems. In 1974, the author, in conjunction with a colleague from the Philosophy Department, created a three credit program called ' Searching for Values' which sought to intensify and enrich some of the objectives of the original course 'In Search of Values.'

The course description resembled this outline:

SEARCHING FOR VALUES

3 credit program for students who wish to:

1) Become more fully aware of their own values and understand how these values affect their own personal decision making.

2) Understand how they acquired their values and learn techniques to clarify them.

3) Learn techniques of self-study, independent and critical reading and thinking.

4) Meet a single group of students and teachers with whom they can share experiences for at least half their program at Dawson.

METHODS - will involve a wide range of approached - subject to the interests of the student and negotiation with one of the instructors.

1) Small group seminars on specific readings

2) Tutorials on specific readings

3) Self-study modular units

4) Value clarification exercises

5) Community project work (Teaching, working in a hospital, various forms of social action.)

A Resource Center and Seminar Room - will provide a wide variety of materials which a student can use whenever he needs them. This Resource Center will include:

1) Readings-Books presenting sociological, psychological and philosophical discussions of values.

2) Tapes and films presenting discussions of values or situations which raise questions of values.

3) Study guide designed to help students pursue specific issues related to the themes of the course.

4) Simulation games to give the student an opportunity to actually experience some problems of decision-making.

COURSES GIVEN FOR CREDIT

Social Science 380 - 962 Introduction to Society

Philosophy of Psychology 340 - 218

Humanities - In Search of Values - 101

The content of the course focused on the following areas:

1) Values and Self-Knowledge

Here the student was given the Rokeach Values Inventory and asked to list 18 institutional and terminal values. Discussions on the reasons for various choices took place between small groups. Students were asked to reflect on some pointed questions concerning their life goals, their formative influences and their vocational aspirations. Some theoretical discussion on the acquisition of values, attitudes and beliefs took place based on some of the work of Allport, Rogers and Rokeach.

2) Values in Technological Society

Here an attempt was made to carry out a critical analysis of certain aspects of contemporary industrial society by discussing Jules Henry's book Culture Against Man in terms of the student's perceptions and experiences. Seminars on writings of the contemporary family, educational structures, economic values and the sub-culture

of adolescence and the aged took place.

3) Psychoanalytic View on Human Nature

In this section, students were expected to read some of the basic writings and critiques of Freud, Erickson and Horney. The role of the unconscious, perceived familial influences and various psychological theories about human behaviour were discussed and critically analyzed in light of modern scientific findings and behaviouristic theories as explicated by B.F. Skinner. Students were made conscious of the controversy surrounding various views of human development and 'consciousness' existing in the contemporary social scientific world.

4) Existential Theory

Students were introduced to the basic ideas of Sartre's article on 'Atheistic Existentialism' where he attempts to summarize the basic position of this form of existentialism and the implications of this philosophy on the individual's life. Religious beliefs and attitudes are discussed in light of Freud's writings in Future of An Illusion and Totem and Taboo.

5) Humanistic Views on Development

In this final section students are asked to read and discuss the basic ideas of Maslow particularly the concept of self-actualization. Discussion on the 'humanistic' view that higher order values come out of the experience of the individual took place and students were asked to look within their own persons for any evidence of this theory.

In addition, to the reading of Jules Henry and outlines on the ideas of the 'psychoanalytic' thinkers and some humanistic

psychologists , students can elect to write a research paper on the ideas of one major contemporary thinker in the area of human values. Papers have been written on Freud, Jung, Erickson, Buber and Maritain. At the very end of the course, students are asked to re-examine their original reactions to the Rokeach Value Survey and attempt to explain any of the differences which might have taken place. Further reading on areas of interest and suggestions for 'related' courses are made to the students.

One of the major priorities which is necessary for the future development of this kind of 'substantive' values-education is to acquire certain kinds of evaluative mechanisms which can clarify the kinds of changes in values and attitudes which students might be undergoing. What kinds of subject area concerns are most likely to motivate students to 'higher' levels of intellectual application? What kinds of students are most affected by which aspect of the course? How does 'keeping a log' actually affect a student's self-concept or perception of the world around him? Do any of the curriculum areas discussed in the course affect a student's attitudes towards his family, his future occupation and even his political views? A major issue which should be examined is whether teachers should attempt to 'raise' a student's moral development or whether they should concern themselves primarily with stimulating development in intellectual and critical tasks yet at the same time fulfilling 'affective' objectives of motivation and value awareness. At this point of his personal experience with the concept of 'value' in the classroom, the author is not convinced that educators should make 'moral growth' one of their pedagogical

objective. Rather a combination of academic and affective type objectives might be most appropriate for the present classroom situation.

Wilson has probably developed the idea of objectives for values-education farther than any other thinker and some of his objectives might play a role in the future development of this type of course structure.

More specifically, Wilson's objectives in these areas which seem to have the greatest relevance for the future development of the course are:

1) Having the Concept of Person.(This objective seems to be adequately covered in the course but films portraying the implications of certain kinds of character structure will be shown.)

2) Having the Concept of various emotions and moods (This aspect of the course requires much more planning and development. In the future, attempts will be made to integrate Gestalt and psycho-synthesis skills into the course content.)

3) Knowing hard facts relative to moral decisions (Students will be given a great deal of basic social science information about specific issues under consideration).

4) Knowing sources of facts - more opportunities for the development of research skills, critical thinking skills and analytical skills will be created in the future

At this point, the author is engaged in developing this program so that many opportunities for continuous experimental work in schools, hospitals and community agencies exist. As well, many more opportunities for the development of group process and personal growth skills will be made available and a course structure

dealing with the topic of 'Alternative Futures' and the student's role in promoting social change will be offered. Based on the author's experience with this type of course structure, the traditional controversies about 'cognitive versus affective' and 'liberal education versus general education' seem like so many empty words and phrases. The majority of students in this kind of 'technological' society seem to require a 'total' experience which involves many facets of their being: the intellectual, the emotive, the experiential, the imaginative, organized in such a way that learning objectives are always clear and personally meaningful. Criteria for what is acceptable might conceivably involve a combination of 'cognitive and affective' objectives where teaching is concerned simultaneously with developing basic academic and intellectual skills, while developing new interests and 'higher' levels of critical thinking, as well as a keener sense of the 'self' and one's potential for further growth. The link between what is 'inside' the student and what 'there' is in the external world lies in the concept of 'value' and the development of this concept must become a major concern of all those involved in educational activities.

In the year 1976-77 the program will be offered in the following format:

VALUES, EDUCATION, AND ACTION

Values, Education, and Action is a two-credit special programme in personal growth, experiential learning, and social change.

Students will take two credits chosen from the following offerings: required Humanities (101, 301, or 401); Philosophy of Education; Sociology of Education; Social Science (962). Students must regist for this programme individually at a special table in the Humanities section at Registration. During the term students will engage in a supervised teaching project in the community, as well as weekly classroom experiences. Students are invited to continue their work by registering in th.. programme for a second term.

Curriculum: Curriculum will treat three major areas in an integrated manner -- personal and interpersonal development skills; theoretical understanding of issues in individual and social development and in education; and supervised field-work in teaching.

Personal and interpersonal development skills include: values-clarification and values confrontation skills; communication and helping skills; curriculum of self; psychosynthesis , gestalt, group dynamics and organization development techniques.

Theoretical understanding will treat: major social, psychological, economic and political analyses of contemporary society, including the psychoanalytic and humanistic psychological tradition; behavioural science and organizational change; major educational issues, learning theory, and educational futurism.

Supervised field-work: all students will experience helping others to learn, through a long-term commitment with a school, social institution, or independent studies. Many options are available in

tutoring, pre-school through collegial education, special education, alternative schools, human potential teaching, social animation and other fields.

Methodology and Resources: Learning methods include lectures, readings, discussions, games, simulations, and demonstrations, group dynamics, field research and field visits, tutorials, written work, and ongoing student journals. Resources will include a system of modules (self-paced information units organized by major topics); A-V materials; and a network of resource persons and organizations in the community. (F. Rosensweig and Harry Wagschal)

FOOTNOTES

1. Humanities Curriculum Report, Dawson College 1969.

2. Harry Wagschal, "Can Schooling Serve the Cause of Mental Health?" Canada's Mental Health, Jan-Feb. 1973.

3. Gerald Collier, John Wilson, Peter Tomlinson, Values and Moral Development in Higher Education, London: Crown and Helm, 1974, p. 9-10

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APPENDIX I

Rokeach's Terminal and Instrumental Values

TERMINAL	INSTRUMENTAL
a comfortable life	ambitious
an exciting life	broadminded
a sense of accomplishment	capable
a world at peace	cheerful
a world of beauty	clean
equality	courageous
family security	forgiving
freedom	helpful
happiness	honest
inner harmony	imaginative
mature love	independent
national security	intellectual
pleasure	logical
salvation	loving
self-respect	obedient
social recognition	polite
true friendship	responsible
wisdom	self-controlled

APPENDIX II

3.0 VALUING

3.1 ACCEPTANCE OF A VALUE

One of the distinguishing characteristics of this behaviour is consistency of response to the class of objects phonemena etc. with which the belief or attitude is identified. It is consistent enough so that the person is perceived by others as holding the belief or value. At this level we are describing here, he is both sufficiently consistent that others can identify the value, and sufficiently committed that he is willing to be so identified.

Continuing desire to develop the ability to speak and write effectively.

Grows in his sense of kinship with human beings of all nations.

3.2 PREFERENCE FOR A VALUE

Behaviour at this level implies not just the acceptance of a value to the point of being willing to be identified with it, but the individual is sufficiently committed to the value to pursue it, to seek it out, to want it.

Assumes responsibility for drawing reticent members of a group into conversation.

Deliberately examines a variety of viewpoints on controversial issues with a view to forming opinions about them.

Actively participates in arranging for the showing of contemporary artistic efforts.

3.3 COMMITMENT

The person who displays behaviour at this level is clearly perceived as holding the value. He acts to further the thing valued in some way, to extend the possibility of his developing it, to deepen his involvement with it and with the things representing it. He tried to convince others and seeks coverts to his cause. There is a tension here which needs to be satisfied; action in the result of an aroused need or drive. There is a real motivation to act out the behaviour.

Devotion to those ideas and ideals which are the foundations of democracy.

Faith in the power of reason and in methods of experiment and discussion.

4.0 ORGANIZATION

4.1 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF A VALUE

Conceptualization will be abstract, and in this sense it will be symbolic. But the symbols need not be verbal symbols. Whether conceptualization first appears at this point on the affective continuum is a moot point, as noted above.

> Attempts to identify the characteristics of an art object which he admires.
>
> Forms judgments as to the responsibility of society for conserving human and material resources.

4.2 ORGANIZATION OF A VALUE SYSTEM

Objectives properly classified here are those which require the learner to bring together a complex of values, possibly disparate values, and to bring these into an ordered relationship with one another. Ideally, the ordered relationship will be one which is harmonious and internally consistent. This is, of course, the goal of such objectives, which seek to have the student formulate a philosophy of life.

5.0 CHARACTERIZATION BY A VALUE OR VALUE COMPLEX

The individual acts consistently in accordance with the values he has internalized at this level, and our concern is to indicate two things: a) the generalization of this control to so much of the individual's behaviour that he is described and characterized as a person by these pervasive controlling tendencies, and b) the integration of these beliefs, ideas, and attitudes into a total philosophy or world view. These two aspects constitute the subcategories.

5.1 GENERALIZED SET

A generalized set is a basic orientation which enables the individual to reduce and order the complex world about him and to act consistently and effectively in it.

5.2 CHARACTERIZATION

Objectives categorized here are more than generalized sets in the sense that they involve a greater inclusiveness and, within the group of attitudes, behaviours, beliefs, or ideas, an emphasis on internal consistency. Though this internal consistency may not always be exhibited behaviourally by the students toward whom the objective is directed, since we are categorizing teachers' objectives, this consistency feature will always be a component of Characterization objectives.

As the title of the category implies, these objectives are so encompassing that they tend to characterize the individual almost completely.

Develops for regulation of one's personal and civic life a code of behaviour based on ethical principles consistent with democratic ideals.

Develops a consistent philosophy of life.

APPENDIX III

LAWRENCE KOHLBERG

Definition of Moral Stages

1. PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels in terms of either the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favours), or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following stages:

Stage 1: THE PUNISHMENT AND OBEDIENCE ORIENTATION. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4.)

Stage 2: THE INSTRUMENTAL RELATIVIST ORIENTATION. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

2. CONVENTIONAL LEVEL

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitudes is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: THE INTERPERSONAL CONCORDANCE OR "GOOD BOY - NICE GIRL" ORIENTATION. Good behaviour is that which please or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behaviour. Behaviour is frequently judged by intention - "he means well" become important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

APPENDIX IV

PROJECTS AND PROSPECTS: APPLIED RESEARCH IN VALUES EDUCATION IN CANADA

JOHN R. MEYER
Director, Values Education Centre
Burlington, Ontario, Canada

The past few years have witnessed a blossoming of projects related to values education (moral education, moral development, etc.). At the moment there is no single clearing-house for information about these many projects but an attempt has been made by a group of humanists to provide such a service. What is common to most is that they provide variations of three components: a) curriculum development (learning materials, models, design, field-testing), b) professional development (inservice, preservice, accredited courses, and c) evaluation (assessment instruments).

1. Canada

(A) London Board of Education:- Pilot work has been going on for several years under a committee of teachers working on a family-of-schools basis. Careful scrutiny was made of the Beck-Kohlberg-Simon approaches. Some in-class activities were explored and now a teacher has been released as a resource person and coordinator for more widespread implementation.

(B) Halton and Hamilton Boards of Education:- Since September of 1973, these two boards have participated in a pilot project largely commissioned by the Ministry of Education. The Dimensions of the project are comprehensive in grade levels (k-12) and in scope of measuring moral growth with a large sampling of student population of teacher involvement. A dozen models (affective education, humanizing techniques, communication and interpersonal techniques, moral reasoning, inquiry skills, decision-making processes) have been examined for level and classroom appropriateness.

(C) The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education:- There are two projects which are centered in the department of the history and philosophy of education and which focus on various aspects of values education. The moral education project under the direction of Clive Beck and Ed Sullivan is concerned with: 1) research into sequential development of ultimate life goals, 2) moral reasoning of a sample of Ontario adults, 3) continued determination of moral reasoning patterns of 13-15 year olds, 4) evaluation of a "school program" model, 5) the "organic fusion" model, and 6) alternate teaching strategies. Graduate course, seminars, colloquia, workshops, and publications have been offered.

(D) York County Board:- For several years the research office of the Board and OISE collaborated on a project involving the moral reasoning powers of early adolescents. Subsequently, the Ministry of Education provided a two-year grant-in-aid for educational research into the development of a more satisfactory assessment instrument of moral growth and human relations capacitics. The work of Brian Burnham and Joe Murphy now enters its second year. A resource library, inservice component, and a newsletter has also emerged.

2. British Columbia

The Association for Values Education and Research (- AVER) has been in existence since 1971 as an interdisciplinary team of the Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia. Its purpose is fivefold: 1) to study the nature of normative discourse, 2) to identify the components of moral competence, 3) test development, 4) to identify procedures which enhance moral development, and 5) disseminate materials and procedures designed to promote the development of rational normative deliberation and decision. Other activities include bibliographic work, inservice workshops, and materials development.

3. Manitoba

Commencing in the fall of 1973, the Manitoba Department of Education and the Faculty of Education of the University of Manitoba have been engaged in a project entitled, "Social Concerns and Curriculum Development, K-12" The objectives include: analysis of alternate curricular models and developmental approaches, identification and analysis of cooperative team work and professional development, evaluation procedures, and materials development with a focus upon values and politics, ecology, moral growth, and the third world.

4. Nova Scotia

For several years there has been a separate course approach in the intermediate and secondary levels of one or more school in the Cape Breton area. Through the initiative of Larry Rankin, a structured syllabus has been created for this optional course. Themes are developed in a sequential manner. The first course for teachers will be offered during the summer of 1975 at the newly forned College of Cape Breton (Sydney).

Conclusion

Proportionate to its population, it can be said that Canada is leading the field in terms of applied research and implementation though generally on much less funding due to the provincial character of Canadian educational structures.

APPENDIX V

RECTIONS OF STUDENTS TO THE COURSE "IN SEARCH OF VALUES"

From a sample of 50 students who answered a questionnaire in the Spring of 1975, these were some of the reactions to this course:

"The Journal had the most important impact on me. I was able to organize my thoughts and come to some conclusions about myself."

"I have never really considered my values as much as I am doing now. Everybody has values! I know I had some but I never really had the chance of really looking at them and using them consciously. When we did the value survey, I began to really judge myself. Lately, I have found muself thinking about my values seriously. This is something which I have never done before. After having examined my values, I found that I don't know too much about myself. Lately, I have been trying to be more honest and open with myself. I have been very critical with myself. I learnt that in order to know yourself that you have to constantly ask yourself why? Why did I do this? Why did I say that? One value I have thought about is the role of 'honesty' in my work as a part-time sales girl."

"The only real change that I found in myself is the ability to express my feelings in words from the practice I received in writing in my log. My personal values certainly didn't change but I did enjoy the course."

"The books didn't have any effect on my personal life but the entire course did start me thinking about different topics, mostly my relationship with people and how man makes his/her own life."

"The material studied hasn't directly changed any part of my own life, not, at least physically, but it has led to greater insight and greater alternatives on my part. I find myself doing a lot of thinking about values."

dealing with the topic of 'Alternative Futures' and the student's role in promoting social change will be offered. Based on the author's experience with this type of course structure, the traditional controversies about 'cognitive versus affective' and 'liberal education versus general education' seem like so many empty words and phrases. The majority of students in this kind of 'technological' society seem to require a 'total' experience which involves many facets of their being: the intellectual, the emotive, the experiential, the imaginative, organized in such a way that learning objectives are always clear and personally meaningful. Criteria for what is acceptable might conceivably involve a combination of 'cognitive and affective' objectives where teaching is concerned simultaneously with developing basic academic and intellectual skills, while developing new interests and 'higher' levels of critical thinking, as well as a keener sense of the 'self' and one's potential for further growth. The link between what is 'inside' the student and what 'there' is in the external world lies in the concept of 'value' and the development of this concept must become a major concern of all those involved in educational activities.

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